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Introduction  
The primary concern of this thesis is tracing and articulating the political 
consequences of the Internet as applied to the formation of public opinion.  This thesis will 
present a critical interpretation of a larger theoretical problem while concentrating on two 
related empirical cases.  The broad question that this thesis will ultimately address is this: 
how, and to what extent has the Internet provided a new platform for the continued 
ideological hegemony of the American elite?  Can an empiric relation be drawn between the 
rise of Internet-based technologies and contemporary political polarization in public 
opinion?  How has the digital market for media affected the content as well as the 
production of the news?  By reevaluating two lead accounts of news media production and 
opinion formation, this thesis will argue that the market forces of the digital environment 
have pushed the American people to the political extremes, which has provided the elite 
with an unexpected opportunity to further solidify their philosophy as the dominant 
American ideology.  In addressing this argument, this thesis will also explore an 
unexpected commonality between two different political scientists, Noam Chomsky and 
John Zaller, in which their two different models actually work to complement one another’s 
broader conclusions.                 
In 1988, Noam Chomsky coauthored a book with Edward Herman titled 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, in which they detailed the 
ideological domination of the media by the American corporate elite.  Four years later in 
1992, John Zaller wrote his seminal work The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion in which 
he develops a theory to explain how people convert political messages into political 
opinions.  Though some may doubt that Zaller, a mainstream empirical political scientist, 
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and Chomsky, a public intellectual, have much in common, I will argue that their two books 
come together in working to explain the entire picture of American mass media, from elite 
production down to mass consumption.  The union of the two works is their similar 
conclusions regarding elite domination of public opinion.  While Chomsky explicitly 
investigates this domination, Zaller takes a much subtler approach to the question.  But 
what about the broader implication of the models, to what extent has the Internet 
exacerbated the way in which news is produced or consumed?         
 To investigate the conclusions drawn from the authors, this essay will evaluate the 
two book’s methods, one for the production of mass media and the other focusing on the 
consumption of that same media.  On the side of production, this thesis will be using the 
Chomsky/Herman Propaganda Model to understand the nature of corporate media.  On the 
side of consumption, Zaller’s RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample) Model will be used to 
understand and interpret public opinion.  Although the nature of these models is seemingly 
dichotomous, the two are not mutually exclusive.  Chomsky/Herman’s Propaganda Model 
uses five distinct filters to explain the “self-censorship” of corporate media while Zaller’s 
RAS Model uses a quantitative analysis to explain the mechanism behind how a person 
constructs the political ‘opinions’ that they report to pollsters, including their own layer of 
personal censorship based on partisan predispositions.  Despite that Chomsky and Herman 
originally wrote that mainstream media was under the thumb of the elites; they remained 
optimistic that future technological developments would promote the growth of an 
independent media.   On the other hand, Zaller, who found that political opinions are 
strongly dependent on exposure to elite communications, came to the pessimistic 
conclusion that people’s opinions tend to be unstable and susceptible to manipulation.  
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Surprisingly, both works confirmed the ubiquity of elite domination in mass media yet they 
differed significantly in their assessment of the implications of this domination.  While 
Chomsky thinks that elite domination is the root of America’s problems, Zaller disagrees in 
that he believes that elite domination is natural and, more or less, unavoidable.  But to what 
extent are the authors’ arguments affected by the technological developments that have 
characterized the last two decades?  Are their conclusions still valid?   
To address this question, this essay will first look to discuss some important 
developments that have taken place in the twenty years since the models’ original 
publication.  This thesis will first look to address the extent to which American’s use the 
Internet to consume news media.  Second, this thesis will look to understand how the news 
industry has adapted to a digital marketplace.  Other developments that are significant to 
my arguments are the processes by which people choose which news to consume, the 
paradigm of partisan press outlets, and finally, the polarized environment that has now 
come to characterize American politics.    
The last two sections of the paper will be dedicated to examining the models 
through a contemporary lens.  The first of these sections will apply Zaller’s model to today’s 
digital environment and will then develop a theory to explain the recent trend of political 
polarization using contemporary political scholarship.  The latter section will look into the 
applicability of Chomsky/Herman’s model to online corporate media, address their 
optimistic predictions about technology and ultimately explain where the authors went 
wrong in their original analysis of the future.       
The primary purpose of this paper is to apply the Propaganda Model and the RAS 
Model to this new, “cyber” America.  The analysis will focus extensively on evaluating 
  Longhurst 5 
which model better predicted, and better explains, the political environment of today.  By 
using Zaller’s model, this thesis argues that technology is the driving force behind 
contemporary political polarization.  Using Chomsky’s model, this thesis will also argue 
that it is the elite-driven market forces that turned the Internet into this force behind 
polarization.  Together, these two models provide the critical framework for understanding 
how the Internet has become the newest platform by which elites can manufacture our 
news, opinions, ideologies, identities and more.       
The Production of Media: A Propaganda Model 
 An interesting similarity between both Zaller and Chomsky’s approach to their 
questions is that both recognize the top-down nature of the issue.  Chomsky’s model, which 
deals with the production of mass media, helps us to understand the role of the “top.”  
While Zaller, who deals with consumption, helps us to understand the “bottom” half of the 
relationship between media and public opinion.  This section will summarize Herman and 
Chomsky’s methods and conclusions regarding the top-down production of corporate 
news. 
First published in 1988, Chomsky and Herman’s Manufacturing Consent had the 
opportunity of investigating corporate media at a particularly interesting moment in 
American history.  The Vietnam War had ended, the American public had adopted the Civil 
Rights Movement and Ronald Reagan’s presidency was coming to a close.  Most 
importantly however, advances in technology had allowed majority of Americans to own 
television sets and thus furthered the trend of Americans choosing televised news over 
traditional print.  Noam Chomsky, professor Emeritus of linguistics and co-author 
professor of finance Edward Herman wrote their book in response to what they saw as a 
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covert subversion of “free” press.  The book’s central argument is that corporate media 
serves “to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private 
activity, and that their choices, emphases, and omissions can often be understood best . . . 
by analyzing them in such terms” (p. liv).   
 To account for the innate complexities of corporate mass media, Chomsky and 
Herman developed a multi-dimensional model that categorizes and explains the processes 
behind which factual events get translated into the script of the news anchor.  The first 
filter of understanding the nature of the press is to understand who actually owns the 
media companies themselves.  In the late 1980s, the authors found that 29 companies were 
accountable for close to half of all media output, translating to roughly 13,000 media 
entities in all (p. 4).  However, since the original publication of their work, the authors 
(2002) have updated the figures such that “two dozen firms control nearly the entirety of 
media experienced by most U.S. citizens,” and this statement factors into account many 
Internet media-outlets as well.  Moreover, they argue that of the nine largest companies 
“that now dominate the media universe, all but General Electric have extensively 
conglomerated within the media, and are important in both producing content and 
distributing it” (p. xiii).  When the majority of the population’s news source is produced by 
a handful of companies, the inherent dangers should be clear.   
 The second filter of the Propaganda Model addresses the source of profits for press 
outlets, namely income brought in by selling advertisement spots.  The idea is that because 
press outlets rely on their funding from selling ad space, they must do all they can to attract 
the attention of companies looking to advertise.  To accomplish this, outlets must “help 
advertisers optimize the effectiveness of their network” by planning their programs such 
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that it attracts as many viewers as possible (p. 16).  Unfortunately, it is no longer the 
quality of journalism or news coverage which determines the success of a media outlet but 
rather it is the “advertisers’ choices [that] influence media prosperity and survival” (p. 14).  
This particular filter played a significant part in their overall analysis of the production of 
mass media, and as this paper will later address, its role has only grown stronger since the 
Propaganda Model was first conceived.   
 The third filter of Chomsky/Herman’s model is titled the “Sourcing of Mass-Media 
News,” and implies just what its title suggests.  Before an explanation of the filter is given, it 
should be noted that of all filters, it is precisely this one that draws corporate media “into a 
symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and 
reciprocity of interest” (p. 18).  Despite media’s deep entwinement with big business (recall 
the second filter), it is this filter that makes the media apparatus fully dependent upon 
powerful American institutions.  The idea is that corporate media outlets cannot afford to 
send journalists all over the world fact checking, so instead, they rely on government and 
corporate sources for the information that they then deliver to the public.  This filter holds 
a significant position in the production of mass media in that it diminishes the role of press 
from truth-seeking, whistle-blowers to that of the middlemen who simply report what they 
are told.  Economically, it makes sense for press outlets to rely on “informative” reports 
because “taking information from sources that may be presumed credible reduces 
investigative expense” (p. 19).  As well as affecting the production of news, this filter also 
figures into the equation of the publics’ consumption of that news.  As the next section 
explores, this filter is of particular significance to Zaller’s analysis in that it gives elites an 
easy route to manipulate opinions.  Because people tend to believe at least some of what 
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they hear (or read), those who produce the raw data (i.e. government reports) have a 
disproportionate effect on people’s opinion because their findings tend to be reported as 
the “objective” truth by the press.    
 The fourth filter of the model is corporate media’s aversion to flak, where flak refers 
to “negative responses to a media statement or program” (p. 36).  Economically, flak can be 
a serious financial consequence to press outlets in that parts of their audience may boycott 
their programming in response to something they find offensive.  Moreover, if a company 
or foundation takes offense to a particular story or program, that organization will likely 
not choose that particular outlet to advertise on.  Regardless of pulling their business from 
these outlets, the real danger is that an offended organization may file a lawsuit against 
that press outlet, as was the case with Westmoreland and CBS in 1977 (p. 27).  The flak 
apparatus wields a disproportionate amount of authority in the production of mass media, 
by “regularly assailing, threatening, and ‘correcting’ the media” this apparatus is able to 
consistently deter press outlets from reporting contrarian stories (p. 28).   
 The final filter of the Propaganda Model was originally titled “Anticommunism As A 
Control Mechanism,” and is the only filter to speak directly to the ideology of the elite.  In 
America, it is the role of corporate media to “identify, create, and push into the limelight” 
the dominant American ideology, which during the late 1980s was anticommunism (p. 31).  
To be seen as a respectable source of news, press outlets must be obedient to this dominant 
ideology and report stories that promote, not discourage, the many messages inherent in 
the ideology of the elite.  And as this thesis will later show with Zaller’s model, more often 
than not, this is the ideology that gets inculcated into the American public.    
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 Taken together, these five filters provide an interesting perspective on how to 
interpret the daily news.  Regardless of how effective the model was at explaining the 
production of news in the late 1980s, the real question is the predictive power of the 
model, and whether or not Chomsky and Herman’s predictions about the future of mass 
media were validated or not.  But what exactly were the conclusions and predictions that 
the authors drew from their models? 
 In their book’s conclusion, Chomsky and Herman reinforced their argument that 
corporate media serves to “inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda 
of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the stage” (p. 298).  Despite 
this grim prognosis of American media, the end of their concluding chapter takes an 
optimistic note as the authors begin to describe the “counterforces at work with a potential 
for broader access.”  They go on to explain how the increased availability of cable and 
satellite communications “has weakened the power of the network oligopoly” and detail a 
growing number of locally produced programs.  The authors go on to encourage “grass-
roots and public-interest organizations” to make use of this new technology (p. 307).  
Although it is not explicitly written (the widespread use of the Internet had not quite 
occurred), it can be assumed that the authors would have also encouraged these 
organizations to make use of the Internet in order to avoid the corporate monopoly of 
network television.  At this point in our history, both Chomsky and Herman had hope that 
the production of mass media was on the verge of dramatic change.  Emergent technology 
was allowing for more independent news startups and people were beginning to 
understand the extent to which their nightly news reports were “manufactured.”  Even 
after a multi-million public-relations campaign on behalf of the US government, “elite 
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domination of the media [had] not succeeded in overcoming the Vietnam syndrome and 
public hostility to direct U.S. involvement in the destabilization . . . of foreign governments” 
(p. 306).  The corporate media apparatus was strong, but not unbeatable.  Chomsky and 
Herman remained hopeful that by exposing how processed mainstream media was, the 
American people would begin to demand a more democratized and independent press.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that though Noam Chomsky is regarded as an advocate of 
the common man, his analysis of elite domination largely overlooks the effects of mass 
media on the people themselves.  On the other hand, Zaller’s book, which is described as 
analysis of the institution of public opinion, is much more concerned with the effects of 
communications on a personal level while largely ignoring the broader implications.  
Ironically it is Chomsky who has faith in the people yet doubts the elites and Zaller who 
doubts the people yet trusts the elites.  But why, and to what extent, does Zaller not put his 
faith in the common man?                   
  Consumption of Mass Media: The RAS Model 
 As discussed in the introduction, the study of mass media and public opinion is an 
interdisciplinary field that requires dynamic approaches from all sides.  So far, this essay 
has outlined Chomsky and Herman’s approach to understanding the production of mass 
media, but now this thesis will begin to examine the consumption of manufactured media 
and the ways it is transformed into public opinion.  Although there have been many notable 
works that examine how mass media affects public opinion (V.O. Key’s Public Opinion and 
American Democracy, Philip Converse’s The American Voter), this study will focus on an 
ambitious, modern book written by professor John Zaller.  In his book, The Nature and 
Origins of Mass Opinion, Zaller develops a unique model to interpret how people consume 
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political messages and come up with the opinions they express to pollsters.  Written in 
1992, Zaller’s work had the advantage of being written at a time when there were many 
decades worth of survey datasets that he could base his research from1.  Conveniently, by 
reviewing Zaller’s analysis twenty years after its original publication, this thesis is in a 
position to address the model’s applicability to American public opinion today.   
 Echoing Chomsky and Herman’s work, Zaller prefaces his model by holding that “the 
information that reaches the public is never a full record of important events and 
developments in the world” and that public opinion data must be understood in light of this 
fact (p. 7).  Zaller openly admits that media is manufactured in the top down manner earlier 
suggested by Chomsky and Herman yet chooses to only focus his analysis on the lower half 
of the mass media puzzle.  The model Zaller developed to understand how people react to 
abridged news is titled the ‘RAS Model’ where RAS is an acronym for receive, accept and 
sample.  The model seeks to understand how the public consumes mass media and how 
this consumption of media then gets translated into “opinions” that are later reported to 
political pollsters.  It needs to be noted that the independent variables of the model are the 
amount of coverage devoted to an issue by the press (topic saturation) and the individual’s 
level of political awareness.   
The best way to understand the nature and applications of the model is to 
understand the model’s tenets.  The first of four axioms of the RAS Model is the “Reception 
Axiom” which holds that “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an 
issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to . . . political messages concerning that 
message” (p. 42).   In practicality this axiom holds that people who watch, read or hear 
                                                        
1  Zaller primarily relies on data from the Center for Political Studies and National Election Studies at the 
University of Michigan (Zaller 1992: xiii).    
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more news receive more political messages and thus tend to be more politically aware.  
The second part of the model is the “Resistance Axiom” which says that “people tend to 
resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions” but only to the 
extent that they are politically aware enough to do so (p. 44).  Here it needs to be noted that 
it is with great care that Zaller chooses the word “predispositions” opposed to ‘beliefs’ or 
‘opinions.’  As he writes in the beginning of his book, “people do not have fixed attitudes on 
every issue” (p.3).  Zaller, and his model, refute the idea that people have a static political 
philosophy that leads to fixed political opinions, what they do have is a partisan 
predisposition likely inherited from their upbringing.  It is precisely these first two axioms 
that will later be applied to the case of digital news consumption.        
 The first two parts of his model are concerned with the reception of messages, but 
the latter two parts are dedicated to understanding the transition between receiving and 
processing those political messages.  The third axiom is the “Accessibility Axiom” which 
states, “the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the 
less time it takes to retrieve that consideration . . . and bring [it] to the top of the head for 
use” (p. 48).  Zaller’s notion with this axiom is that information that a person recently 
received is much more salient to them than similar information they received in the past.  
The final component of the model is the “Response Axiom,” which states “individuals 
answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately 
salient or accessible to them” (p. 49).  It is chiefly this axiom that speaks directly to the 
mechanism behind how people answer political pollsters and express their political 
opinions.  Now that the basic structure of the model has been identified, it is time that the 
use, significance and practicality of the model be explained.  
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 In essence, the model can be understood like this: people are constantly exposed to 
political messages through a variety of mediums (headlines, conversations, social media, 
classrooms etc.), they then either accept those messages or refute them according to their 
previous political predispositions.  This means that people’s political “opinions” are 
nothing more than the sum of all these messages that they have received (where newer 
messages hold more influence over these “opinions”).  The significance of the RAS Model is 
that it provides a mechanistic understanding of the ‘trends’ in public opinion that are so 
often referred to by political pundits.   
An important consequence of the model is that politically aware people “are 
substantially more stable in their attitude reports” than less aware people and that these 
same politically aware people tend to have more extreme opinions (Zaller 1992: 43, 85).  
What these deductions lead to is arguably the most important implication of Zaller’s 
analysis, which is that there is a direct correlation between political polarization and 
political awareness in situations where there are competing partisan messages (i.e. gun 
control), and that this relationship is amplified by topic-saturation by the press.   It is 
interesting to note that where Zaller approaches the question of message-consumption by 
delineating between the two mainstream competing messages (Democratic or Republican), 
Chomsky treats the issue differently.  To Chomsky and Herman, it is arbitrary to define the 
message as “liberal” or “conservative” because despite the content of the message, it is 
going to fundamentally reflect the ideology of the elite.  Both Zaller’s deductions, and 
Chomsky’s critical approach, will be of considerable significance when later evaluating how 
digital technologies have affected the basic empirical structure of Zaller’s model and 
Chomsky’s interpretation of digital news production.   
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 By describing how media produced messages can polarize the American public and 
the role that the press plays in shaping public opinion, Zaller is able to explain the 
underlying mechanism behind the consumption of mass media.  But some of Zaller’s 
assumptions seem untenable due to changes of the last twenty years.  In the development 
of his model, Zaller (1992) points out that: 
Most people, this research maintains, are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking 
behavior that they will expose themselves only to ideas that they find congenial.  To the 
extent selective exposure occurs at all, it appears to do so under special conditions that do 
not typically arise in situations of mass persuasion.  (p. 139)   
 
As this thesis will explore, although this idea may have been true in the early 1990s, it does 
not apply today.  People do not simply turn on the nightly news, but rather they turn on 
their nightly news.  But what about Zaller’s predictions, to what extent have they been 
confirmed or disproved by technological developments?   
 Unlike Chomsky and Herman who predicted that new technologies in the field of 
communication would enable the growth of independent press, Zaller’s conclusions were 
much less optimistic.  Regarding his model, Zaller did not offer any predictions on how the 
Internet was going to change how people processed political messages.  On the other hand, 
he did offer predictions on the larger picture of public opinion.  In his conclusion, Zaller 
(1992) writes that, “the argument of this book is . . . scarcely encouraging with respect to 
domination of mass opinion by elites” and that even highly aware citizens tend to “respond 
to new issues mainly on the basis of the partisanship and ideology of the elite sources of 
their messages” (p. 311).  He finds that in cases of elite consensus, there is little press 
coverage on the topic eliciting little to no public opinion on the subject.  But when there 
does exist disagreements among the elites and their experts, “the result will be a 
polarization of the general public along lines that mirror the elite ideological conflict” (p. 
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327).  Although he could not have known the extent that this idea would be played out in 
years to come, this may have been the RAS Model’s most applicable prediction for 
American public opinion.   
Unfortunately, even during the time-period in which the book was originally 
written, the RAS Model’s overarching finding is that majority of people are easily 
influenced by elite messages, thus making their political opinions highly accessible for the 
media to manipulate.  Without intending to do so, Zaller completed what Chomsky and 
Herman began.  Chomsky explained the oligarchic production of media, and Zaller showed 
that it is precisely this media that shapes the public’s political opinion.  But both these 
models were designed to address questions related to them two decades ago, can either 
model be considered relevant to today’s world?  I argue yes; applying Zaller’s model to the 
digital environment of today allows one to understand how digital news consumption led 
to political polarization.   
The Polarization Effect 
One of the dominant goals of this thesis is to apply the central ideas of the RAS 
Model to the new media environment in hopes to better understand political polarization.  
To understand this connection, one must first understand how Zaller himself addressed the 
topic of polarization and how his model is designed to process partisanship.  His 
fundamental finding was that “increases in political awareness are associated with more 
polarized” opinions in the presence of competing ideological messages (Zaller 1992: 110).  
By quantitatively exploring what he called the “polarization effect,” Zaller was able to 
provide numerical evidence that as people’s political awareness increased, so too did the 
partisanship of their responses to political surveys.  To explain this trend, Zaller writes that 
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“Democrats and Republicans tend to reject messages from the opposing party, and liberals 
and conservatives reject persuasive communications that are inconsistent with their 
ideologies” (p. 267).  The idea is that the more politically aware a person is, the more 
messages they encounter; but also the more suited they are to discern between “liberal” or 
“conservative” messages and reject them accordingly2.  And although few people are 
certain of all the beliefs that delineate a “liberal” from a “conservative,” most are able to 
“stake out roughly comparable positions on a series of seemingly unrelated left-right value 
dimensions” which allows them to create the “ideology” by which they identify themselves 
(p. 27).  After describing the above trends, Zaller does not explore any implications that the 
“polarization effect” may have on American public opinion.  Instead he chooses instead to 
frame the “polarization effect” in terms of elite domination, a theme that will be developed 
in later sections.        
In an early effort to explain the mechanics behind how the “polarization effect” 
shapes public opinion, Zaller set up a basic table to explain the RAS tenets3: 
 
 
 
 
      Level of Awareness 
     Low  Middle  High 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Probability of Reception   .10  .50  .90 
Probability of Acceptance|Reception           .90  .50  .10 
                                                        
2 By “liberal” and “conservative” messages, it is meant to refer to the political philosophies defined by the 
commonly held notions assigned to the “right” and “left” by the political elite (government officials, 
journalists, lobbyists, experts etc).   
3 Exact table replicated from Zaller (1992): 125 
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Probability of Change in Opinion  .09  .25  .09 
 
 Table 1, attitude change in response to a hypothetical unpartisan message 
 
The effect of this table is that it numerically shows the way in which political awareness 
affects political attitude.  The first row, “Probability of Reception,” refers to the probability 
that someone actually reads, hears, or sees the message.  The second row, “probability of 
acceptance-given-reception,” refers to the chances that someone accepts/internalizes that 
message, given that they received it.  The third row, “Probability of Change in Opinion,” 
calculates the overall probability that a person will change their attitude in relation to the 
message.  From this hypothetical table one can see how it is more likely for more aware 
people to receive political messages (row 1) while also being less likely to accept those 
messages that they have received (row 2).  People who are less aware receive fewer 
messages but they are much more likely to accept the messages that they do receive (row 
2).  Finally, one can observe that highly aware and lesser-aware people are the least likely 
to change their attitudes (row 3), but for different reasons.  To explain the role of 
partisanship, Zaller went on to stratify the population by ideology.  The following is his 
table constructed to measure the theoretical response to an arbitrary “liberal” message4: 
 
 
Level of Awareness 
    Among Liberals   Among Conservatives 
    Low    Middle    High  Low    Medium    High 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Probability of Reception  .10 .50 .90  .10 .50             .90 
Prob (Accptance|Reception)           .90 .85 .80  .90 .46    .02 
                                                        
4 Table leaves out data for moderates, for exact table refer to Zaller (1992): 127 
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Probability of Change in Opinion .09 .425 .72  .09 .23    .018 
 
 Table 2, attitude change in response to a liberal message 
        
This table shows the dynamic relationship between political philosophy, political 
awareness and attitude formation.  The idea is that highly aware liberals are more likely to 
conform to the “liberal” doctrine while highly aware conservatives are more likely to reject 
“liberal” messages.  Without loss of generality, the trends would be the same if the arbitrary 
message were a conservative one instead.  The key variables addressed here are the 
likelihood that people receive political messages and their probability of rejecting those 
received messages based on their predispositions’. 
 Zaller based these tables on the fact that it was largely the role of people’s 
predispositions that regulated their resistance to certain political communications.  This 
paper will demonstrate that it is these same political predispositions that not only lead 
people to resist political communications, but also prevent certain political 
communications from ever being received.  Zaller argued that awareness precipitated 
resistance towards contrary messages.  Today, awareness precipitates prevention of 
reception of contrary messages.   
 From table 2 it is clear that for polarization to occur, the probability that a liberal 
accepts a “liberal” message must increase while that same probability for a conservative 
must decrease.  For this to happen, the probability of reception and message-acceptance of 
that “liberal” communication must increase for liberals while decreasing for conservatives.  
Let’s first deal with the case of reception.   
Consumption of Media: From Bad to Worse 
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This section will demonstrate how the way in which the American public consumes 
news digitally can explain contemporary political polarization.  Using Zaller’s model to 
understand the relationship between political awareness and predispositions, I will show 
how the “’niche news’ paradigm” and the “echo chamber effect” (both explained below) can 
both be used to explain the partisan-driven politics of America today.   
As mentioned above, Zaller (1992) held that people are “not so rigid in their 
information-seeking behavior that they will expose themselves only to ideas that they find 
congenial,” in the early 1990s people watched the news not their news (p. 139).  But as this 
section will argue, this claim of Zaller’s has been outdated and remains inapplicable in 
today’s political world.  In their 2009 publication Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of 
Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, professors Iyengar and Hahn found that although 
American’s historically got their daily news from “one of three network newscasts” that all 
offered a “homogeneous and generic ‘point-counterpoint’ perspective on the news,” the 
settings of media consumption has changed (p. 20).  Anymore, “consumers can access—
with minimal effort—newspapers, radio, and television stations the world over” which 
increasingly leads people to choose their media in accordance with their “partisan 
considerations” (p. 20).  By testing the effect that news sourcing/labeling (Fox, CNN, NPR) 
had on people’s selectivity towards news stories, the authors were able to conclude, “the 
divide in news selection between liberals and conservatives is considerable” (p. 29).  
Surprisingly, this trend of press outlet selectivity held for non-political topics such as 
sports, travel or local crime as well (p. 19).   
 In a similar study published in Communications Research, Dr. Silvia Knoblock-
Westerwick found that the participants in her study tended to choose to read articles that 
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they felt would support their predispositions.  Because people have so many media outlets 
to choose from, they tend to “choose messages that converge with preexisting views” 
(Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009: 445).  Despite that technology easily allows access 
to contrary discourse, this research found that most people simply choose not to access it.  
By being able to limit oneself to preferable media outlets, “technology has facilitated 
citizens’ ability to seek out information sources they find agree- able and tune out others 
that prove dissonant” (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012: 28).  To summarize, it is has been 
found that there is ample evidence that suggests that people are selective when choosing 
their source for news.  Moreover, this selectivity is amplified by technology in that people 
can instantly choose the news they prefer and limit exposure to outlets of which they 
disapprove.  These studies confirm that people are more selective when choosing where to 
get their news, but are the political communications of these outlets really so different?  
Let’s now examine the case of polarization among the press outlets themselves.   
 Although the association between Republicans with Fox or Democrats with MSNBC 
seems obvious, this clear distinction between ‘red’ and ‘blue’ news has not always been so 
apparent.  With the growth of cable networks and the introduction of the Internet, news 
media has experienced “a more fragmented information environment in which . . . news 
outlets compete for attention” (Iyengar and Hahn 2009: 20).  And it is precisely because of 
this “crowded national market” that media outlets are experiencing “weaker economic 
incentives to aim for a politically moderate” audience (Prior 2013: 6).  Concomitantly, there 
is now a “strong economic incentive for news organizations to cater to their viewers’ 
political preference” which helps to explain the “‘niche news’ paradigm” of today’s media 
(Iyengar and Hahn 2009: 21).  In multiple studies, it is commonly found that Fox news 
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tends to sympathize with conservative elites and viewpoints, while companies such as 
MSNBC and the New York Times tend to take more liberal stances (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; 
Prior 2013; Starr 2010).  The significance of this trend is that it threatens the validity of 
Zaller’s original conclusions because he accounted for the effect of partisan messages, but 
not the effect of a partisan press.       
In a 2010 article ran in the Atlantic, Princeton’s Paul Starr describes the new 
dynamic created by the “intensification of ideological journalism.”  He writes that although 
America has historically had partisan press outlets, “partisan media are now firmly part of 
our national conversation.”  Despite the seemingly daunting reality of institutionalized 
polarization, Starr remains optimistic and argues that “democracy needs passion, and 
partisanship provides it.”  Although it has been documented that certain “talk radio shows, 
cable news channels, and websites do offer more ideological extreme packages of news and 
opinions” some remain skeptical as to whether or not this is an inherently dangerous 
development in American politics (Prior 2013: 7).   
I argue that a partisan press is a dangerous development and when paired with a 
partisan audience, the two factors lead to a more polarized America.  Consider table 3, 
which is similar to table 2, but with updated numbers for the probability of reception (row 
1): 
 
  Level of Awareness 
    Among Liberals   Among Conservatives 
    Low    Middle    High  Low    Medium    High 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Probability of Reception  .20 .65 .98  .05 .35             .50 
Prob (Accptance|Reception)           .90 .85 .80  .90 .46    .02 
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Probability of Change in Opinion .18 .553 .784  .045 .161    .01 
 
Table 3, reflects updated hypothetical probability of reception to a liberal message 
   
The original numbers have been replaced by new hypothetical figures that better 
reflect the partisanship of press outlets and the partisanship-driven selectivity of press 
outlets on behalf of the consumers.  The updated numbers reflect the fact that “liberals” 
watch liberal news thus they are exposed to more liberal messages, leading to a higher 
chance of reception.  On the other side, “conservatives” watch conservative news thus 
lowering their chances of being exposed to “liberal” messages.  The hypothetical numbers 
are constructed in such a way to reflect the findings of Iyengar and Hahn5 (2009) and 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009)6 and Prior (2013).   
From simply updating the first row, Table 3 produces some interesting results.  On 
the side of the liberals, across the three categories we see over a 28% increase in the 
chance that any liberal (low-high awareness) will change their opinion to match that of the 
message, with the largest increase being among those liberals who are moderately aware.  
On the side of the conservatives we see over a 19% decrease in the chance that any given 
conservative from the three populations adopts the “liberal” message as opinion.  Just from 
updating the probabilities of reception to match contemporary American politics, the table 
demonstrates how public opinion can polarize.   
 Now that the effect of a polarized press and partisan-driven selectivity have on 
public opinion has been suggested, the updated probabilities for message-acceptance-
                                                        
5 Iyengar and Hahn (2009) found that Republicans chose “liberal” outlets (CNN/NPR) around 10% of the time 
(p. 28).     
6 Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) found that the more aware a person was, the longer they spent 
reading “attitude consistent messages” (p.442).  Moreover, they found that people spent 36% more time 
reading opinion-confirming stories as opposed to contrary stories (p. 443). 
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given-reception need to be considered.  The following table updates the final probabilities 
of the RAS Model in accordance with the “niche news paradigm.”  The idea is that self-
identified “liberals” consistently choose to consume liberal media because it speaks to their 
predispositions.  Concomitantly, they identify with these political communications because 
they come from a “liberal” source.  This is known as the “echo chamber effect” which helps 
to explain why “liberals viewing MSNBC or reading left-of-center blogs may well end up 
embracing liberal talking points even more firmly” (Sunstein 2012).  People accept the 
opinions of those they trust, and they trust those who speak to their dispositions.  This 
trend is confirmed by Iyengar and Hahn (2009), where the authors comment on the trend 
of partisans labeling contrary arguments as “erroneous” and ignoring the message 
altogether.        
 Level of Awareness 
    Among Liberals   Among Conservatives 
    Low    Middle    High  Low    Medium    High 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Probability of Reception  .20 .65 .98  .05 .35             .50 
Prob (Accptance|Reception)           .95 .95 .90  .80 .35    .02 
 
Probability of Change in Opinion .19 .6175 .882  .04 .1225    .01 
 
Table 4, reflects updated hypothetical probabilities of both reception and message acceptance of a 
liberal message  
   
Table 4 is similar to table 3 but has an updated second row to reflect the discussed “echo 
chamber effect.”  From the table, it is easy to see that an updated second row will alter the 
final probability that a person will accept the message (third row).  Comparing to Table 2, 
there is now over a 45% increase in the chance that any given liberal across the three 
populations will adopt the “liberal” communication as opinion.  On the other wing, there is 
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now a 24% total decrease in the chances that any given conservative changes their opinion 
to that of the “liberal” message.        
So what are the consequences of this updated news consumption paradigm?  
According to the theoretical updates of Zaller’s original data, a more polarized American 
public.  But is America actually politically polarized, if so, to what extent?  The next section 
will aggregate many different pieces of evidence, from measurements of congressional 
voting to American’s evaluation of out-party presidential incumbents, showing the 
existence of a divided America.   
A Polarized America  
The section will briefly review the literature suggesting that America is in fact 
politically polarized.  In the top-down fashion that previous sections approached 
production and consumption of media, the first evidence of political polarization analyzed 
will be that of political elites.  In their recent book detailing the polarization of American 
politics, professors Poole, McCarty and Rosenthal are able to provide “systematic evidence” 
that the “behavior of members of Congress in fact has become highly polarized along a 
liberal-conservative ideological dimension” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006: 16).  By 
analyzing the roll call votes of members of Congress and looking into the ideological 
ratings7 of members of Congress, the authors are able to deduce that since the mid 1970s, 
Senators and Representatives of the House tend to vote along party lines, and tend to be 
much more ideologically polarized themselves.  Moreover, the authors argue that the 
dwindling number of moderates in Congress further shows this trend of polarization (note 
                                                        
7 These ratings tend to be compiled by interest groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action, League 
of Conservation Voters or the Chamber of Commerce.  The technicalities and validity of these indices are 
discussed in their book Polarized America, pages 16-20.    
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the recent departure of Maine’s own Olympia Snowe) (p. 15).  Reflective of the polarization 
among political elites, it should be of no surprise that there has also been a polarization of 
the Democratic and Republican parties political platforms (Alesina and Rosenthal 2000).  
More than the polarization of the institutionalized political elite, it is also important to look 
at political players who are out of the public eye.  According to political scientists Layman 
and Carsey (2002), two professors’ who have written extensively on the subject, there is 
“considerable evidence that the parties’ convention delegates and grassroots-level activists 
have grown more polarized on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues” (p. 786).  The 
significance of looking at the role played by party activists is that “the policy positions of 
electoral elites and the political perspectives of the mass electorate are shaped heavily by 
the ideological orientations of the parties’ activists” which as previously noted, “have 
become increasingly polarized among multiple ideological dimensions” (Layman and 
Carsey 2000: 25).  But what about the American public, are they too split by partisan lines?   
The drift towards the political poles of the American public is evidenced by a 
reduction in the number of battleground states and recent Congressional elections that 
have been characterized as “the least competitive in history,” due in part to the lack of 
moderates or true swing voters in the American public (Abramowitz, Alexander, and 
Gunning 2006: 75).  But to what extent are the voters themselves actually polarized?  Some 
critics would be quick to dismiss polarization as an “illusion stemming from the tendency 
of the media to treat conflict as more newsworthy than consensus” (Iyengar and Hahn 
2009: 19).  But evidence suggests otherwise.  In a recent study looking at trends of self- 
reported political philosophy, it was found that the “relationship between ideology and 
party identification has increased dramatically” which in turn “has contributed to higher 
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levels of party loyalty in presidential and congressional elections” (Abramowitz and 
Saunders 2006: 175).  Meaning that liberals are highly likely to vote Democratic 
consistently and conservatives are likely to vote Republican consistently.  The study went 
on to find that the between 1972 and 2004, the “average difference in ideological self-
placements of non-activists Democrats and Republicans more than doubled” (Iyengar and 
Hahn 2009: 20).  Accompanied with this partisanship self-assessment, there has been an 
increasingly partisan trend in the way in which people evaluate presidential incumbents.  It 
has been found that “negative evaluations of a president of the other party have steadily 
intensified” and that there exists “a widening partisan chasm between Democrats and 
Republicans” accompanied with an unmistakable increase in those who report at the 
extreme (strongly disapprove/approve) regarding the president’s performance (Iyengar 
and Hahn 2009: 20).  Along with simply drifting towards partisan labels, there is also 
evidence that suggests that political polarization may in fact be indicative of a cognitive 
phenomenon as well as a political one.      
In an interesting new take on political polarization, political scientists Iyengar, Sood 
and Lelke (2012) have argued that political polarization is best to be understood in terms 
of affect rather than ideology.  They believe that by investigating the way in which 
“partisans view each other as a disliked out group,” one could better explain polarization 
on a broader, social level (p. 2).  By finding that partisanship is a now stronger social divide 
than either race or religion, they are able to quantitatively and qualitatively show how 
Democrats and Republicans are beginning to loathe one another (p. 11).  Although they 
dispute the claim that it is “true ideology” that divides us (most are not clear on what 
exactly a “liberal” or “conservative” believes), their findings are nonetheless significant to 
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this thesis in that they offer evidence of the growing political polarization among the 
American public.   
In a final effort to chart the depth of American political polarity, I will now turn to 
some interesting results found from the General Social Survey (GSS).  In 1991, when asked 
whether or not they believe a woman should be allowed to have an abortion for any reason 
(an inherently political question), 59.3% respondents who labeled themselves as a “strong 
liberal” agreed while 44.4% of those whom labeled themselves as a “strong conservative” 
thought likewise8.  Interestingly, when the exact question was asked in 2004, 75% of strong 
liberals agreed while only 28.2% of strong conservatives did.  This works out to be a 15.7% 
increase in “strong liberals” who answer “liberally” and a 16.2% increase in “strong 
conservative” who answered “conservatively” (according to common definitions of 
liberal/conservative).  Although these numbers are not meant to rigorously “prove” the 
existence of a polarized America, they are provided to help substantiate this essay’s claim 
that America is notably more polarized than it was two decades ago; a trend that neither 
Chomsky/Herman or Zaller could have predicted. 
So far this thesis has demonstrated that a partisan press, paired with the fact that 
people prefer partisan news, has led to political polarization.  Figure 1 reflects the 
arguments so far: 
                                                        
8 Actual question reads: “Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman 
to obtain a legal abortion if she wants it for any reason?” Results based off of 557 and 514 responses 
respectively, no weights or filters applied.  Mnemonic code: ABANY. 
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Figure 1, sources of political polarization 
Now this essay will evaluate how technology plays a role in mass political polarization.  To 
preface this argument, I will first explain some of the technological developments that have 
happened between the America of when Zaller and Chomsky constructed their models and 
the America of today.   
Digital America: Technological Developments since 1990 
 There is no event, or year, that clearly separates ‘contemporary’ America from the 
America during which Zaller and Chomsky/Herman wrote their books. However there are 
a couple of unique characteristics that this essay will use to distinguish between the two.  
The following sections of this thesis will argue and demonstrate that there has been a clear 
increase in the following since the early 1990s: Internet use, use of the Internet to access 
news media and the capitalization of online news media.  It is clear that the digital media 
environment in America has changed since 1990, and this section will help translate simple 
observations into investigative implications.   
 The following data will provide evidence of the Internet “boom” of the early 1990s 
and explain it’s consequential effects on the political economy of American mass media.  I 
argue that the digital consumption of news has exasperated both the “echo chamber effect” 
and the “niche news paradigm” and that the competitive market for online news has 
adversely affected the content of the news.   
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In 1995, six years after the original publication of Manufacturing Consent and during 
a time when the Internet was still relatively “new,” there were an estimated 16 million 
users9.  By June of 2012, that number had jumped to 2,405 million users.  To put that into 
perspective, the number of Internet users jumped from 0.4% of the world’s population in 
1995 to 34.3% in 2012.  In conjunction, in the year 1998 (Google’s first year) there were 
3,600,000 searches done on Google.  By the year 2011, this number had climbed to almost 
to two trillion, a number several thousand times larger than before (Statistics Brain 2012).  
More than just usage, the content of the Internet has grown exponentially as well.  
According to the website-management firm Pingdom, in June of 1993, two years after the 
creation of the first website, there had only been 130 website total.  But by 2008, there 
existed over 260 million websites, an almost incomprehensible increase (Pingdom 2008).  
Finally, this trend is matched by results from the GSS where in 2000, only 74.7% of all 
respondents reported using the Internet for activities other than email while in 2004, this 
number jumped to 94.6%10.  These figures should make it clear that there has been a 
drastic increase in Internet use since the early 1990s.   
 Concomitant with this rise of Internet use is the increase of the American public 
preferring to read their news online.  Accompanied with this change is a decrease in 
readership of traditional print publications.  According to a 2012 study done by the Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, only 23% of people polled reported reading a 
print newspaper, down from 47% in 2000 (Mitchell and Rosentiel 2012: 1).  Although less 
substantial than the loss suffered by print media, television news consumption among 
                                                        
9 According to a report by Miniwatts Marketing group. 
10 Actual question reads: “Other than for e-mail, do you ever use the Internet or World Wide Web?”  Percents 
based off of 1,339 and 723 responses respectively, no weights or filters applied.  Mnemonic code: WWWUSE. 
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those thirty and younger dropped from 49% in 2006 to 34% in 2012 suggesting that even 
televised news may be beginning to lose its place in the media market (p. 2).  Although 
viewership remains stable among older Americans, the previous data suggests that the 
landscape of news consumption is changing.  In 2004, only 24% of respondents reported 
getting their news online compared to 39% in June of 2012.  Interestingly, the previous 
number does not include those who use tablets, Smartphones or other non-computer 
devices to read online news.  Accounting for these, the same study finds the percent of 
people who read news online using any medium jumps from 39% to 50%, which seriously 
rivals the number of those who get their news from television, currently at 55% (p. 9).  
Looking at the figures for television, radio and print newspapers shows that 71% of people 
still get their news from at least one of these sources, while only 50% get their news from 
online platforms (websites, email, Twitter, Facebook, podcasts) (p. 10).  But a closer look at 
this data reveals that the true disparities in the data are age related.  Looking at those aged 
18-24, 60% report using an online medium for news while only 43% report using 
traditional platforms.  On the other hand, 86% of Americans aged 65 years or older 
reported using traditional sources of news while only 28% reported using digital platforms 
(p. 10).  Finally, it is important to note that the number of people who regularly get their 
news from television has dropped from just below 80% in 1992 down to 48% in 2012.  For 
those who regularly read a daily newspaper this number has dropped from just below 60% 
in 1996 down to 38% in 2012 while those who regularly (defined as three or more days a 
week) got news online jumped from near 1% in 1996 to 46% in 2012 (p. 14).    
The above data helps confirm the suspicion that consumption of news media has 
changed.  This data makes it clear that in recent years there has been a drastic increase in 
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the number of Americans who use digital platforms to access and consume the news.  
Second, we can expect this trend to continue as the population begins to shift towards the 
more digital friendly age groups.  It is precisely these technological developments that are 
integral to understanding how to adapt the RAS Model to modern parameters.   
Technology, Polarization, and the RAS Model   
 When most scholars investigate political polarization, they tend to discuss whether 
it’s the fault of the political elite, the corporate media or whether or not it all derives from 
the American public.  Although the study done by Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) 
did not speak to the origins of polarized press selectivity, their investigation did lead them 
to conclude, “observed selective intake may indeed play a large role for increased 
polarization in the electorate” (p. 445).  Separately, a polarized press and partisan-based 
selectivity both lead to political polarization; together, these circumstances lead to an even 
more politically divided society.   
 Or consider a recent New York Times (2012) article in which Harvard’s Cass 
Sunstein discusses “biased assimilation,” the idea that people process media 
communications “in a selective fashion.”  Similar to what Zaller wrote twenty years prior; 
Sunstein believes that people treat different communications differently.  The problem is 
that “balanced presentations can fuel unbalanced views,” when people receive 
communications that “undermines their initial beliefs, they tend to dismiss it.”  
Surprisingly, Sunstein does not recommend neutral news (people will simply pick and 
choose which arguments to believe), but rather he argues that the solution can be found 
among the political elite.  If elites were more centrist, the media would adjust their 
reporting and the ideological centrism would trickle down to American the public.  
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Ironically, this ability of the elites to shape public opinion simply by adjusting their own 
“opinions” is exactly what worried Chomsky and Herman.  But for Sunstein and Zaller, 
elite-produced ideology does not present a significant problem.   
What this essay argues is that the origins of political polarization can be found in the 
Internet boom of the 1990s.  Most research goes no further than looking at the relationship 
in figure 1.  This essay maintains that it is technology that led to the two factors that yielded 
political polarization:  
    
Figure 2, Technology’s effect on the mass media paradigm  
Because it is difficult for news-media companies to financially profit in the digital 
marketplace, news companies have resorted to partisan reporting in hopes to appeal to at 
least part of the American public.  Moreover, because the Internet offers consumers so 
many choices, people have the ability to only consume news that they find politically 
agreeable.  Finally, because people consume news that reinforces their opinions, they grow 
more partisan in their beliefs and will be even more devoted to their partisan press outlet, 
which in turn encourages ideological bias on part of the news companies themselves thus 
completing the “echo chamber” effect.   Reevaluating the RAS Model based on the 
technological developments of the last two decades allows for a clearer understanding of 
the nature and origins of political polarization.    
 It is interesting and perhaps ironic that Zaller solved the riddle of public opinion at 
the moment it was about to change dramatically.  But if Zaller’s model could deduce 
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political polarization, why did he not consider it significant?  For one thing, Zaller could not 
have known the extent to which people would become selective in their outlet preferences, 
nor could he have known the magnitude to which the digital realm would grow.  But on a 
more fundamental level Zaller knew the big picture was not about political polarization, it 
was about elite domination.   
A New Dynamic: Understanding Digital News Media  
To place political polarization in the context of the new digital media environment, 
this paper must first describe how exactly this “new” environment differs from the old 
“traditional” news environment.  My argument is that the dynamic costs of advertizing and 
the lack of a revenue generating mechanism have created a difficult market for online news 
media, one which prioritizes profit over content.  The idea of this section and the next is 
that by applying Chomsky’s model, it can be understood how the new mode of production 
for digital media produces just as much “manufactured” news as traditional methods.  
Before discussing how the new media environment figures into Chomsky and Herman’s 
analysis, it is important to discuss these developments in the context of the “new” America.  
The changing dynamic of news media is stated in the Pew Research Center’s 2011 The State 
of the News Media: 
The old news economic model was fairly simple. Broadcast television depended on 
advertising. Newspapers on circulation revenue and a few basic advertising categories. Cable 
was split half from advertising and half from cable subscription fees. Online, most believe 
there will be many different kinds of revenue. This is because no one revenue source looks 
large enough and because money is divided among so many players. (Rosentiel and Mitchell 
2011) 
The current problem facing news media is fundamentally economic.  Americans have made 
the switch to online news consumption yet they are less likely to pay the user fees that 
have been traditionally associated with news media i.e. paying for cable or for a newspaper 
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subscription.  In that same report it was found that although many different newspapers 
“have moved to some kind of paid content on their websites” only about 1% of users chose 
to pay for that content.  In fact, the only press outlets that have been successful in charging 
for their content are those that sell “financial information to elite audiences” such as the 
Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal.  In an environment where news media can no 
longer profit from user fees, companies must begin to heavily rely on the one alternate 
source of revenue: advertising.     
 To understand what role modern advertising plays in digital news media, one must 
further distinguish between the two primary methods of online advertising.  First there are 
banner ads, where companies pay to have their banners, logos or links displayed on other 
company’s websites, giving consumers immediate access to the advertiser’s website.  The 
other type of advertising is referred to as ‘search’ advertising where companies pay search 
engines such as Google or Bing for the rights to certain keywords.  When a consumer 
searches for those purchased words, that company’s website comes up on the search 
results page.  In example, type “news” in Google and the first link may be for the Wall Street 
Journal or CNN.  The problem for news media is that they have to pay high prices for their 
own ‘search’ advertising while relying on diminishing revenues from selling banner ad 
spots to other companies.  
 Regarding the high price that press outlets have to pay for their own search 
advertising, it is best to actually look at the prices themselves.  According to a recent article 
ran in the New York Times, it costs roughly $1.25 cents to “buy” a couple of key words on 
Google.  What this means is that every time someone searches for those words, the 
purchaser’s website pops up as a search result and if that someone clicks on that website’s 
  Longhurst 35 
link then that company must pay Google $1.25 (Dahl  2012).  Though $1.25 may not seem 
large, it can easily add up to ten thousand dollars a month or more, which “’can bleed many 
a small business dry,’” including local news outlets looking to expand digitally (Dahl 2012).  
 Because reporting news has never been an inherently profitable business, press 
outlets are forced to rely on selling banner ad space to offset the high costs of adaptation 
their business model to the digital market.  The problem is that banner ads only make up 
about 23% of the online advertising market, and of that market over half is dominated by 
five large companies (i.e. Facebook) (Rosentiel and Mitchell 2011, 2012).  What this means 
is that of all those companies who want to advertise online, only 12-13% will even consider 
advertising through an online press outlet.  Unfortunately, “the news industry, late to adapt 
and culturally more tied to content creation than engineering, finds itself more a follower 
than a leader shaping its business” (Rosentiel and Mitchell 2011).  By relying on Internet 
“aggregators” (such as Google or Facebook) to bring press outlets their audience, then 
further relying on software developers (like Apple or Google) to deliver their content to 
consumers, there is not much profit to be gained from digital news coverage (Rosentiel and 
Mitchell 2011).  Struggling to survive without a sustainable stream of revenue, many worry 
that these complex difficulties will lead to a general devaluation of the field of journalism as 
media outlets scramble to recover from their losses by stretching their journalists thinner 
and offering less original news coverage. 
 The news media is having a difficult time with the transition from traditional 
mediums to digital-based consumption.  From the corporate level down to local 
newspapers, press outlets are struggling to reinvent their revenue model as they are 
continually faced with soaring advertising costs and lack of sustainable income through 
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established methods.  But what exactly are the implications of the described trends above?  
The significance in defining the “new” America in terms of a new corporate model is that it 
allows us to reevaluate Chomsky and Herman’s original approach and predictions based on 
the technological and social developments of the last two decades.   
Manufacturing Content: From Staged News to Sensational News 
 The purpose of this section is to apply the Propaganda Model to the conditions of 
the digital media environment.  I argue that Chomsky/Herman’s model is fully adaptable to 
the digital news market and can be used to explain how exactly news is manufactured 
today.  In it’s original form, Manufacturing Consent provided countless examples evidencing 
the clear existence of a manipulated media apparatus that denied the American public 
balanced, representative news.  But to what extent have digital technologies affected the 
validity of Propaganda Model as applied to the America of today?  Has the changing news-
media industry fixed the problems that Chomsky and Herman described or has the new 
business model only exasperated the problems?  This section will demonstrate how the five 
filters can still be used to address modern informational hegemony.  Moreover, this section 
will go on to critique the authors’ original predictions while explaining how the authors’ 
themselves have updated their previous predictions.   
 To demonstrate that the Propaganda Model is adaptable to the dimensions of 
today’s digital world, I will address each filter individually.  Recall that their first filter is in 
regards to the size and elite ownership of the corporate media.  Their idea was 
concentrated ownership of news media by elite corporations would inherently put the 
owners’ vested interests above content.  In their original 1988 analysis, Chomsky and 
Herman found that 29 companies controlled near half of all media outlets.  But in 2012, 
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Ashley Lutz of the Business Insider found that about six companies now effectively control 
90% of the media in America.  The six corporations collectively own and operate 70% of 
cable channels while the remaining 30% is divided among the other 3,762 media 
companies.  It is estimated that around 178 million unique users consume news produced 
by Time Warner (which owns CNN, TIME, Huffington Post) monthly.  Clearly, the elite 
group of news producers in America has grown even more exclusive since the original 
writings of Chomsky and Herman. 
 But how exactly has the development of the Internet itself affected this filter?  In an 
article appropriately titled “Has the Internet Changed the Propaganda Model?” 
journalist/editor Sheldon Rampton argues that low startup costs for websites has 
encouraged the development of the type of independent news companies that Chomsky 
was hopeful for.  Rampton (2007) goes onto to write, “the price of entry into internet 
publishing is dramatically lower than the price of entry into traditional media such as 
newspapers and television.”  For examples, Rampton explains how successful companies 
like Wikipedia and Craigslist started off as single-employee ventures.  The flaw in 
Rampton’s reasoning is that he treats all web-startups alike.  As the Pew Research Center’s 
2011 and 2012 edition of The State of the News Media continually suggested, digital news 
media is not profitable.  The price of attracting customers is higher while there is 
diminishing marginal returns on selling banner advertisements to third parties.  The 
Internet provides a way for anyone to successfully create and manage a website, but in this 
digital environment, it is harder than ever to stand out.  Engaged citizens can easily create a 
source for balanced, independent news; but it is unlikely that they will be able to attract 
much support given that even the largest companies are having a difficult time financing 
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their digital branches.  Or as Chomsky and Herman (2002) put it in their updated 
introduction, “the Internet is not an instrument of mass communication for those lacking 
brand names, an already existing large audience, and/or large resources” (p. xvi).  Digital 
technologies have created a difficult dynamic for news-media outlets, big or small.   But 
Chomsky and Herman’s first filter is still applicable considering that six media giants 
produce close to the entirety of the communications that the American people watch, hear 
and read on the Internet.     
 Now consider the model’s second filter, advertising.  Originally, the authors argued 
that because press outlets heavily rely on revenue from advertising, it is the advertisers’, 
not the consumers, which ultimately decide which outlets will be successful.  But how has 
this filter been changed by the introduction of the Internet and other digital technologies?  
Rampton (2007) argues that the Internet has partially liberated news media from the 
constraints of catering to the advertisers’.  He writes that although “advertising-heavy 
websites may attract more revenue than ad-free sites . . . they hardly provide a quality 
advantage.”  Once again he goes on to cite the cases of Wikipedia and Craigslist suggesting 
that these two websites (both free from paid advertisements) are proof that companies do 
not always have to rely on ad-revenue.  Unfortunately, Rampton’s arguments simply do not 
apply to the digital news-media environment of today.  Recall the Pew Research Center’s 
The State of the News Media, which clearly outlined how only 1% of people choose to pay 
for online content (2011) while less than 10% of people choose to buy an app for their 
news (2012).  People are not willing to pay for their news through traditional methods 
anymore.  The future and success of the digital press will be reserved for those outlets 
“who can target content and advertising to snugly fit the interests of each user” (Rosentiel 
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and Mitchell 2011).  The problem is that “new community media sites are beginning to put 
as much energy into securing new revenue streams . . . as creating content” and even 
“larger national online-only news organizations focused more on aggregation than original 
reporting” than in years prior.  Chomsky and Herman share this belief that the Internet has 
not loosened the advertisers’ grip over press content as well.  In response to the new 
market dynamic presented by digital technologies “large media entrants into the Internet 
have gravitated to making familiar compromises-more attention to selling goods, cutting 
back on news, and providing features immediately attractive to audiences and advertisers . 
. . the boundaries between editorial and advertising departments have weakened further” 
(Chomsky and Herman 2002: xvi-xvii).   
 Related to the financial difficulties associated with online advertising is the model’s 
third filter, information-sourcing.  The idea is that the news that people consume is often 
just reporters repeating what they found out from government officials or public relations 
departments.  When it comes to the relationship between this filter and the Internet, there 
are two disparate schools of thought.  The first of these beliefs is what has loosely been 
termed “citizen journalism” or “participatory journalism” which is the idea that the Internet 
has become the new medium for which all citizens can play “an active role in the process of 
collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information” (Bowman and 
Willis 2003: 9).  The Internet has provided many different approaches (i.e. blogs) for 
people to get their voice out there and circumvent more traditional styles of reporting.  
People argue that this in turn leads to a more diverse informational environment where 
consumers can truly get their news from the grassroots level and avoid relying on the 
“official” sources that Chomsky/Herman previously derided.     
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 The opposing school of thought is not quite so optimistic.  The idea is that genuine 
reporting done by professional journalists is fading into history11 because of the difficult 
market environment for press outlets.  Because of “lower pay, more demands for speed, 
less training, and more volunteer work, there is a general devaluing” of the entire journalist 
profession.  As one commenter pointed out, “’some vitally important stories are less likely 
to be covered . . . It’s very frightening to think of those gaps and all the more insidious 
because you don’t know what you don’t know’” (Rosentiel and Mitchell 2011).  News 
companies, small to large, have to make financial sacrifices to stay afloat in the digital age; 
unfortunately, there are diminishing resources to go towards critiquing sources, cross-
referencing stories or true investigative endeavors. 
 But which approach is better able to describe the political economy behind the news 
media today?  Although the Internet provides an environment suited for “participatory 
journalism,” I would argue that it is unlikely that those looking for updates on foreign wars 
or domestic reforms will fully trust or believe what is written on blogs.  People have 
become increasingly distrustful of what they read on the Internet.  Take Wikipedia for 
example, majority of its articles are written and studiously edited by professionals yet it is 
still often discredited as an unreliable source.  If people do not trust a site like Wikipedia, 
are they really going trust some no-name website?  In regards to the critical approach to 
contemporary media’s “sourcing,” I am strongly inclined to agree with Chomsky and 
Herman’s updated take on the impact of digital technologies on the presses reliance on 
“official” sources.  The Internet and the diminishing funds devoted to genuine journalism 
“have made the media more dependent than ever on the primary definers who both make 
                                                        
11 Though some believe in this idyllic past of journalism, others, such as Chomsky, are reluctant to believe 
that such a time as this actually ever existed.  
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the news and subsidize the media by providing accessible and cheap copy” (Chomsky and 
Herman 2002: xvii).  It does not matter that anyone can blog or write an op-ed piece; the 
public still chooses to get their news from mainstream sources.  The problem is that the 
sources relied upon by mainstream journalists are being chosen from an ever-dwindling 
number of elites.     
 The idea of consumers being skeptical of what they read online gives rise to the 
model’s next filter, flak.  Chomsky and Herman’s original argument was that mainstream 
press outlets avoid covering certain stories to deter possible retaliatory measures from 
various interest groups or organizations.  But to what extent has the Internet affected the 
validity of this filter?  On a more optimistic note, some believe that the Internet has 
lessened the fear of flak because “lawsuits are difficult to mount and even more difficult to 
win” in the digital environment (Rampton 2007).  Moreover, there is a new degree of 
anonymity that can be reached on the Internet that allows individuals or grassroots 
organizations to report the “truth” without the backlash that usually accompanies such 
reporting.   
 On the less optimistic side, there is Chomsky and Herman’s (2002) belief that digital 
technologies have only strengthened the filter of flak as a mechanism of “elite influence” (p. 
xvii).  They argued this point based on the fact that because corporate press has fewer 
resources to devote to journalism, the media must do their best to not offend those 
companies and institutions that pay their bills.  In 2013, this is still clearly the case.  News 
media is in a financial crisis and must confront a market where advertisers’ are the ones in 
demand.  Because advertisers’ have so many choices and platforms to advertise their 
  Longhurst 42 
product, it is likely that they would not hesitate to pull their ad-spots from an “offensive” 
news company.   
 Another interesting new perspective on flak in the digital age is that of ‘grassroots 
flak.’  The idea is that because many website offer “user comment” sections where any 
reader is able to post her or his thoughts, media outlets have to also worry about how 
consumers, as well as advertisers’, will react to their content.  Recent research details how 
negative user comments at the bottom of an online article seriously effects how unbiased 
consumers react to that news story given that they have read the comments (Brossard and 
Scheufele 2013).  The press must now work to avoid traditional flak as well as flak on 
lesser levels.  Ironically, it was the press outlets themselves who brought on the second 
type of flak through enabling “user comments.”   
 The final, and perhaps most interesting, filter to Chomsky and Herman’s Propaganda 
Model is the argument that mainstream media must adhere to the then-elite ideology of 
anticommunism.  Unsurprisingly, this filter no longer speaks to communism.  But the filter 
was never meant to be limited to anticommunist rhetoric.  The filter was meant to 
encompass the process by which the corporate media must align their communications 
with the dominant elite ideology, whatever that ideology may be at the time.  In 2002, 
Chomsky and Herman suggested that the filter be changed from “anticommunism” to the 
“market ideology” where the “triumph of capitalism” is always respected and never 
questioned (p. xvii).  Alternatively, this filter could easily be adapted to fit with the current 
“anti-terrorist” or “anti-Islam” ideology, or as Rampton (2007) puts it, the “’anti-anti-
Americanism’” ideology.  A perfect example of this can be seen in last fall’s CNN 2012 Tea 
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Party Presidential Debate.  When asked about the roots of 9/11, the moderate Republican 
Ron Paul responded that: 
We’re under great threat because we occupy so many countries . . . we’re there occupying 
their land, and if we think we can do that without retaliation, we’re kidding ourselves . . . 
what would we do if another country, say China, did to us what we did to all those countries . 
. . this whole idea that the whole Muslim world is responsible for this and attacking us 
because we’re free and prosperous, that is just not true. (CNN 2011) 
 
Throughout this explanation of the historical roots of 9/11 Ron Paul was booed by the 
crowd and plainly scolded by his fellow Republican candidates.  What he said was not in 
line with the elite ideology and he was reprimanded accordingly.  Conversely, 
Pennsylvania’s right-wing senator Rick Santorum had this to say about the roots of 9/11: 
“they (the Jihadists) want to kill us because of who we are and what we stand for.  And we 
stand for American exceptionalism, we stand for freedom and opportunity for everybody 
around the world and I am not ashamed to do that” (CNN 2011).  Unsurprisingly, the 
audience cheered Santorum as he confirmed the elite, “anti-Islam” doctrine.   
Chomsky’s predictions: From 1988-2008 
 With the rise of the Internet, many may be quick to dismiss the Propaganda Model 
as an antiquated relic of pre-Internet corporate mass media.  The above section 
demonstrated how the Internet has affected the filters in different ways.  But the real 
challenge is not updating Chomsky’s model for him, but rather investigating how his own 
optimistic predictions have changed since the books first publication in 1988.  Originally, 
both Chomsky and Herman were excited that breakthroughs in technology would allow 
smaller, less-financed groups to begin broadcasting their own news communications.  They 
hoped that because technology was getting both cheaper and more efficient, people who 
were traditionally shunned from the field of reporting/journalism due to lack of finances 
could find solace in new technologies and open up their own press outlet; an outlet that 
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would be free from the five constraints that continually poisoned corporate media.  They 
assumed that by fixing the media at the “top” (by providing alternative news), the people at 
the “bottom” would react accordingly.  They believed that the American people would 
welcome and support this “alternative” type of news if only given a chance.        
But in 2002, roughly a decade after the introduction of the Internet to the American 
public, the authors’ were compelled to readdress their optimistic predictions made the 
decade prior.  Apart from updating the filters themselves, the authors’ also addressed the 
overall role that the Internet plays in American society.  They wrote that although “the 
Internet has increased the efficiency and scope of individual and group networking” and 
has been “a valuable addition to the communications arsenal of dissidents and protesters,” 
the Internet “has limitations as a critical tool” (p. xv-xvi).  By 2002, the authors’ admitted 
that new technologies had not quite had the liberating effect that they had hoped.  
Regardless, they still saw great potential in the Internet as a tool for those who choose not 
to consume mainstream news.   
 In 1988 the authors’ were optimistic that people would rise to the occasion of new 
technology, fourteen years later they conceded that “those whose information needs are 
most acute are not well served by the Internet,” but what about more recently (p. xvi)?  To 
what extent has the Internet further obfuscated Chomsky and Herman’s original 
predictions twenty years after publication? 
 In 2008, Chomsky gave a lecture in Cambridge, Massachusetts addressing the 
Internet’s role in the updated Propaganda Model.  During the lecture, he never deviated far 
from his central argument that the Internet’s effect is not one-dimensional.  He admits, 
“there are serious problems with Internet, but it’s done a lot of great things” (Chomsky 
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2008).  On the one hand, the advantages of the Internet are that it allows worldwide 
connectivity and promotes the dissemination of information and knowledge.  This is the 
advantage of technology that Chomsky and Herman originally thought would enlighten and 
empower the uninformed public.  But giving the people access to the world’s largest bank 
of knowledge is not without problems.  In his lecture, Chomsky described the difficulty:  
If you’re flooded with massive information and you sort of try to wade through it, you’re 
totally paralyzed.  You have to know what to look for, you have to have a framework of 
understanding . . . if you don’t have it, you’re just flooded with meaningless information.  
(Chomsky 2008) 
 
More than the issue of informational-overload, Chomsky argues that the real problem is 
that when people do use a “framework” to interpret what they read or hear, that 
framework “comes from indoctrination that they’ve been subjected too.”   
 One likely reason that people habitually approach the Internet with this problematic 
framework is because of ‘dissident skepticism,’ where discourses that deviate from the 
norm or take a critical approach to mainstream news are labeled as conspiracy theories.  Or 
take for example the prevalence of “flogs” (fake blogs) and fake reviews.  Peoples’ fears 
about small, independent media outlets are only exasperated by this new trend of for-profit 
blogs.  Look at the recent case where Wal-Mart employees were the real creators of two 
supposed “grassroots” blogs that promoted shopping at Wal-Mart while simultaneously 
deriding the many critics of the company.  Because of the inherent anonymity of the 
Internet, companies and institutions are able to easily create “front groups” to push their 
products or messages by way of posing as objective, third party bloggers (Rampton 2007).   
 But more than just diminishing people’s trust in what they see online, these fake 
blogs have went one step further to create their very own market for their services!  As 
“online retailers increasingly depend on reviews as a sales tool, an industry of fibbers and 
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promoters has sprung up to buy and sell raves for a pittance” wrote David Streitfeld (2011) 
of the New York Times.  For an average of five to ten dollars, a company can buy a five-star 
review from a professional reviewer.  Unfortunately, what started out as a small trick to 
boost ratings has turned into an online “arms race” where every company is buying more 
and more top reviews in fear of being left behind by the competition.  Initially, consumers 
thought that online reviews would give them an opportunity to have their experiences 
heard.  But now, more and more are beginning to realize that online reviews are just 
another avenue of profit-motivated deceit.   
 But how does virtual deception relate to Chomsky’s evaluation of effect of the 
Internet on the production of media?  With mainstream media there has to exist at least 
some degree of reputability that people can trust.  Whereas with small, unknown press 
outlets, people are likely to label them unreliable or bias despite the actual quality of their 
content.  The Internet is the best avenue for finding real, unbiased news; but very few know 
how to actually find this news, and even fewer would care to do so.  Ironically, this has led 
to a greater reliance on the “trusted” elite.    
 
 
Chomsky and Zaller Intersect: Conclusions of Elite Domination 
The real congruity between these two models is not that Zaller explains the 
“bottom” while Chomsky explains the “top” of corporate media, but rather that both models 
converge in their conclusions.  Although Zaller certainly did not set out to explain the 
production of media, the implications of the RAS Model make it near impossible to ignore 
the brooding topic of elite control.  On the other hand, whereas Chomsky/Herman were 
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primarily concerned with the nature of the self-censorship of the press, they too could not 
ignore the broader implications of their findings.  Neither book deliberately sets out to 
evaluate the question of elite domination; yet both authors are compelled to speak to this 
facet of American politics.  Interestingly, they take very different approaches.   
In his books epilogue, Zaller includes a subsection called The Parable of Purple Land 
where he describes a fictitious society meant to mirror America.  The parable stresses the 
population’s general lack of interest in politics and their tendency to form their opinions 
based on “the menu of elite-supported options” (p. 314).  Interestingly, Zaller admits that 
public opinion can be tailored to fit the elite ideology yet he does not necessarily frame this 
as a problem.  To defend his argument, Zaller analyzes American citizens in a fashion 
strikingly similar to French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville.  In his book Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville writes, “since life is too short for such a course and human faculties 
are too limited, man has to accept as certain a whole heap of facts and opinions which he 
has neither leisure nor power to examine and verify himself, things which cleverer men 
than he have discovered and which the crowd accepts” (Tocqueville [1835] 2006: 434).  
Americans trust the arguments of those more knowledgeable than themselves simply 
because they lack the time and means to disagree.  Regardless of the merit of this theory, it 
is interesting to see that Zaller agrees with Tocqueville’s ideas.  Zaller writes, “citizens 
could still be confident that, the more closely they looked into a subject, the more likely 
they would be to reach the same conclusions reached by the expert subcommunity sharing 
their own values” (Zaller 1992: 314).  In essence, because Americans tend to be 
preoccupied and lack the resources to intelligibly critique the powers that be, Zaller 
believes that elite domination cannot be avoided.  Elites provide the framework that people 
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need to approach today’s world of mass-disinformation.  The public simply does not care 
enough about politics to challenge the political hegemony in America.  Moreover, the ways 
in which people consume and process news makes it notably uncomplicated for elite 
powers to push their agenda via the press.   
On the other hand, Chomsky and Herman are very concerned about the near 
omnipotent power of the American political elite.  The obvious consequence of elite 
domination is that dissent of the elite ideology is ignored.  The problem, however rare, is 
the case when the American public favors the dissenting message over the elite message.  
For an example, the authors (2002) look to the case of NAFTA, the regional trade 
agreement that would effectively drive labor wages down.  The majority of the American 
public did not favor NAFTA nor did they want it passed despite that the political elite (both 
Democrats and Republicans) supported the treaty.  Even “liberal” press outlets like the New 
York Times and the Washington Post derided the dissidents by suggesting that the “public 
was uninformed and didn’t recognize it’s own true interests” (Chomsky and Herman 2002: 
xvii).  In this case, the public had no avenue of elite representation. Despite that public 
opinion opposed elite ideology, our “representative” politicians easily passed a bill that the 
people did not want.  But the broader issue here is not about specific policies, but rather 
that dissent is entirely excluded from the discourse.   
On this topic, both Zaller and Chomsky agree: there is no equitable avenue of 
discussion for dissenting messages.  Zaller, who does not frame this issue as a problem, 
writes that when elites/specialists agree on one particular policy, all journalists will “say 
roughly the same thing” and the media will frame the policy as a fact rather than something 
to debate or question (Zaller 1992: 327).  Zaller further confirms this idea through his RAS 
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Model where he finds that “in cases of elite consensus, political awareness leads to 
increased support for the mainstream policy,” when people are not given an option, they 
tend to simply support the policy that all the elites support (p. 113).  In line with their 
book’s theme, Chomsky and Herman (2002) argue that mainstream media limits the 
“debate to the terms defined by the two parties” and excludes “deliberation and 
expression” of alternate policy initiatives (p. xli).  But what about the Internet, to what 
extent have digital technologies promoted the dissemination of contrarian ideas? 
At first glance, I believe that many would assume that the Internet is the much-
awaited miracle for dissidents worldwide.  But taking a more critical approach, I argue that 
the Internet has reinforced the American public’s acceptance of mainstream policies.  
Because of the vast amount of information on the Internet, most people simply are not of 
the right framework to discern fact from fiction.  As Chomsky (2008) puts it, when majority 
of people access their news online, “they might as well be reading some tabloid.”  The 
Internet has exacerbated this dichotomy of “sound science” versus “junk science,” where 
every piece published online is accompanied by a counter argument.  Every elite-supported 
initiative is based on “sound science” while all alternative approaches or critiques are 
based on “junk science” (Chomsky and Herman 2002: xlvii).  The problem is not that there 
are critical retorts, but rather that there are so many arguments that it is impossible to 
separate the truth from myth.  The Internet has created a hypercritical environment where 
constant argument leads people into a state of apathetical disinterest.   
 This paper has sought to explain the interesting way in which the Internet, and 
associated technologies, has affected the political economy of American mass media, from 
elite production to public consumption.  Using Zaller’s RAS Model this thesis has 
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demonstrated how contemporary political polarization can best be understood as a 
consequence of digital technologies.  Moreover, this paper has shown how the new market 
forces of the Internet have driven press outlets to the fringes of partisanship while creating 
a skeptical audience that has no choice but to trust the brand-names of mainstream media. 
 
 
Figure 3, implication diagram of my arguments 
Regarding figure 3, it is important to understand that Chomsky/Herman’s model was used 
to explain the role of the outer two rings in figure 3, Zaller’s model was used to explain the 
inner two rings and the juxtaposition of both models was used to suggest the bottom core 
of the diagram.     
Finally, this thesis has disproven Chomsky and Herman’s original predictions of 
technology-as-savior and instead argued that their Propaganda Model still is able to 
perfectly describe the modern process by which news is manufactured.  But what can be 
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concluded about elite domination?  Having reviewed the literature and updated the models, 
I am inclined to believe that Chomsky’s view of the press as the elite’s tool, opposed to 
Zaller’s view of the press as merely a buffer, is a more accurate descriptor of America 
today.  The invention of the Internet gave the world a chance to democratize the hegemony 
of information.  Instead the Internet has simply served as the newest platform of 
capitalistic forces to further enhance the ideological stratification between “right” and 
“left.”  As the “Net Critic” Rob Lucas (2012) writes, “it is hardly surprising that the 
technology of a hyper-flexibilized, insecure, turbulent world offers little security to the 
purposefully structured, meditative mind” (p. 69).  In many ways, this analysis has 
highlighted the worst of both models; Chomsky was right about the elites while Zaller was 
right about the people.  But what broader conclusions can we draw about the interesting 
relationship between Chomsky, Zaller, and technology?   
Reflections and Further Questions 
In a recent publication discussing political scientists’ general lack of interest in 
studying the Internet, professor Henry Farrell (2012) writes, “many social scientists, 
especially senior ones, still find it difficult to believe that the Internet is a matter for serious 
scholarly investigation.”  He goes on to note, “the political science literature on the Internet 
does not cumulate in a very satisfying way.  Hence, it is poorly suited to answering the 
larger and more interesting questions” (p. 35).  When sociologists and psychologists study 
the effects of the Internet on the social well being of Americans, they study the advantages 
as well as the disadvantages.  They study how heightened connectivity affects sociability, 
relationships, adaptability, personal efficacy etc.  Interestingly, this trend of studying both 
the benefits and the consequences of the Internet does not hold true for most political 
  Longhurst 52 
scientists.  In political discourse, the Internet tends to be treated as an affordable medium 
for connectivity, by citing the technology-driven mobilization of the Arab Spring and 
Occupy movements as evidence of the Internet’s role as a political tool for the oppressed, 
many political scientists simply conclude that the Internet is a good development for 
grassroots politics.  Unfortunately, many political scientists go no further in their approach 
to understanding the role of digital technologies in the modern world.  The goal of this 
paper has been to highlight and explain some of the under-studied political consequences 
of America’s digital dependence.   
 High-speed Internet has conditioned people to expect instant gratification.  The 
Internet has pushed parts of American society to the fringes of efficiency: we optimize our 
routes every time we get in the car, we join websites to meet our statistically best-suited 
partners, we purchase our merchandise online without ever having to leave the couch.  But 
real politics are slow, boring and unsatisfactory, something that digital-Americans are 
simply not willing to tolerate.  But are there quantifiable or theoretical consequences to a 
politically shallow, web-surfing population?  
To help clarify my arguments, consider the following metaphor between obesity and 
political polarization.  Obesity is a national epidemic that seems to be the theme of most 
dietary books, articles, shows, programs etc.  Interestingly, despite that so many scientists 
study the subject, no one is yet in a position to definitively declare the driving cause of 
obesity.  Scientists know that diet, exercise, genetics, bacteria and mental-health all 
correlate with incidences of obesity but they are not quite sure which factor is the best at 
explaining the problem.  Despite this, there are two factors that, although maybe not the 
most important factors, figure into the obesity equation nonetheless: Americans eat a lot 
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and Americans eat unhealthy food.  Many think that if American’s simply did not eat so 
much then the effects that bad foods have on the body would be marginalized.  Conversely, 
others think that if American’s only ate healthier food, the quantity consumed would not 
matter as much. The problem is that Americans tend to eat a lot of bad food so the negative 
effects of both factors are combined, leading to higher incidences of obesity.  With this case 
in mind, consider my arguments about political polarization.  Many academics study the 
factors that drive political polarization; polarized elites, a polarized population, income-
gaps etc.  Yet the jury is still out on the real cause that is pushing us to the extremes.  This 
paper has posited two factors that no doubt figure into the equation of polarization: the 
way in which people consume news is “unhealthy” and the news that is consumed is 
heavily processed.  Just like obesity, I am inclined to believe one factor without the other 
would not precipitate the polarized state we are now in.  Using Zaller’s models, I argue that 
if people simply consumed less news, the quality of that news would matter less because 
people would not have as many chances to absorb the manufactured messages.  
Conversely, if the news itself was better, it would not matter how often people surfed 
headlines because at least they would be constantly exposed to true, unbiased news.  But 
this is not the case, people constantly surf the headlines and stop only at the sensational 
articles that speak to their partisanship.  Because of this, news companies are encouraged 
to produce more sensational articles in hopes to garner what little attention the American 
consumer has left.  And just like bad foods must increasingly become “tastier” (i.e. Taco 
Bell’s Doritos infused tacos) to remain in the competitive market, so too must news become 
increasingly contrived to keep its audience12.  But how is the Internet behind this?  I argue 
                                                        
12 Micheal Moss’s (2013) book Salt, Sugar, Fat: How the Food Giants Hooked Us details how food corporations 
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that both these factors (bad news and bad consumption habits) are directly born from the 
evolution and dissemination of high-speed Internet-based technologies.  But what are the 
real, broad implications of my findings?  I would argue that more than anything; the 
Internet has provided elites with a new avenue for dividing the American public.  
 The history of America is the history of two choices.  It began as loyalist or patriot, 
then northern or southern, then frontiersman or easterner, then industry or agriculture, 
then black or white, welfare or austerity.  And now, we are “red” or “blue.”  By dividing us 
by so-called “ideology” elites are only expected to provide two options, a red option and a 
blue option.  Some people may ask for a third option,13 however they rarely work hard to 
find the “Third Way” in American politics.  When politics are framed in an arbitrary “us or 
them” context, the population splits and oligarchs are allowed to dominate by obfuscating 
any alternative options.  Take the case of Barack Obama.  By most measures, he is a 
moderate conservative; he has taken a weak “market-approach” to climate change, quietly 
advocated for gay-rights, taken a traditionalist stance on Cuba, passed a moderate- if not 
ineffective- health care “overhaul,” authorized executions without trials of American 
citizens etc.  Despite these and many more examples, the “blues” are happy with Obama 
because at least he is not a “red.”  Liberals do not demand, or even suggest liberal policy 
initiatives.  Instead, they simply support the “blue” policy that Obama suggests.   
 This paper has sought to explain how the above paradox can continue unquestioned 
in American politics.  The messages we receive, and the process by which we consume 
those messages, allow for a quasi-state of disinformation to permanently exist in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
increasingly rely on the science of taste to sell more products. 
13 According to the Federal Election Commission’s report of 2012, Jill Stein (the leading third party 
candidate) received 469,501 votes (0.36% of the popular vote) in the 2012 presidential election.    
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contemporary politics.  But I believe that it was never the original intent of the elite to turn 
the Internet into the latest Tocquevillian yoke of the American people14.  Instead, I am quite 
confident that it was the deep, capitalistic forces of America that transformed the Internet 
from a platform for global solidarity into an invisible chain that politically paralyzes the 
American public and further forces us into unquestioned, polarized obedience.  Alas, as 
Lucas (2012) concludes his own review of the role of the Internet, “the Web, we might say, 
is the pre-eminent technological construct of an increasingly sickly neoliberal capitalism” 
(p. 69).            
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